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This volume offers unique new strategies and management rules for 
investing in, earning and keeping reputation capital safe in today’s 
unpredictable and complex markets. It presents enlightening insights 
from a wide variety of key industries, including the automotive,
chemical, finance, food, luxury, energy and pharmaceutical sectors. 
A team of international authors opens a controversial debate on the 
positive and negative aspects of reputation in the 21st Century, and 
challenges conventional approaches to reputation management, for 
example with regard to CEO positioning, CSR, corporate communica-
tions or social media. Reputation Capital is a practical guidebook 
with a firm foundation in the latest research from leading universities 
around the world; an indispensable tool for people in charge when 
it comes to managing reputation.
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Part III: The 21st century of reputation crisis 
One can survive everything, nowadays, except death, and live down 
 everything except a good reputation. 
 
Oscar Wilde (1854-1900) 
 
 
Reputation and regulation 
Hans Caspar von der Crone and Johannes Vetsch 
Where information asymmetries are inherent in markets, reputation 
serves as an enforcement mechanism. Regulation takes the task of in-
forming participants of their counterparties’ standing by sending quality 
signals to support their reputation, thus allowing for efficient trade. Ef-
fective regulation creates expectations, which may force regulators to as-
sume responsibility for the quality signals issued. The extent of both fi-
nancial and reputational risk to which governments are exposed in 
financial markets requires strong regulation with clear rules for predict-
able intervention.  
In discussions about the current financial crisis, two issues in particu-
lar seem to stand out: reputation and regulation. While the crisis has 
tainted the reputation of many financial institutions and audit compa-
nies, as well as regulating authorities, it has also increased the demand 
for stronger regulation as a means to solve the crisis. However, a closer 
look at the situation reveals a system of much more complex interde-
pendencies between reputation and regulation. This essay aims to ad-
dress questions regarding the mechanism of reputation in the context of 
regulation as well as challenges to regulation. The final section looks at 
the concept of regulation in the financial market.  
The mechanism of reputation 
Ideally, contracting parties have full access to all information necessary to 
define and assess the quality of the performance of the respective counter-
party. Under such conditions of full and symmetrically distributed infor-
mation, parties can write a complete contract specifying all details of their 
future interaction. Virtually no contract, however, is entirely complete, as 
some aspects of the performance relevant to the parties usually cannot be 
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defined in detail ex ante [5, 11, 15].1 The resulting lack of specification re-
duces the ability of a court to assess and enforce the performance of a con-
tract: when formal enforcement is not available, there is limited certainty 
regarding satisfactory performance.2 
Knowing that important aspects of the performance cannot be formally 
enforced, parties will select their counterparties based on their reputation. 
When searching for the best physician or the best lawyer,3 for example, 
people will enquire amongst their friends or business relations for experi-
ences they have had with potential candidates. Physicians and lawyers, in 
turn, know about the importance of their reputation for their business per-
spectives. Keeping their long-term reputation in mind, they will refrain 
from opportunistically making short-term use of the incompleteness of 
their contracts [10, 15, 26, 27]. Reputation therefore is a key element in the 
governance of some of the most important standard contracts of a modern 
economy,4 as the concern for one’s own reputation serves as an alternative 
enforcement mechanism.  
Mechanisms of reputation will only become effective on two conditions. 
First, there needs to be repeated interaction within a group of principals 
and agents: in a repeated play, parties know that cooperation will come to 
an end if performance does not meet expectations [20]. Reputation extends 
the mechanism of two-party repeated plays to multi-party interaction [15]. 
Second, since mechanisms of reputation infer from past to probable future 
behaviour, at least some aspects of past behaviour must be observable. 
Reputation, in this context, is an aggregate of the experiences other princi-
pals have had when dealing with the respective agent in the past, given that 
such information is at least partially available to other principals [1, 33].5 
                                                     
1 A complete contract would lead to prohibitive costs both in drafting and enforcing the contract. Such 
a contract can only serve as a model. 
2 There are substantial variations in the degree of completeness of contracts: while contracts regarding 
standardised commodities usually are complete to a high level (because many such contracts are ful-
filled in single transactions and thus are not subject to changes in circumstances), contracts for ser-
vices show a much larger degree of incompleteness [15]. In Swiss law, the incompleteness and lack 
of formal enforceability of contracts for services is acknowledged with the option to terminate a 
mandate without notice (Art. 404 of the Swiss Code of Obligation) [32]. 
3 Lawyers and physicians are two professions dealing with the issue of information asymmetry due to 
hidden information, i.e. information not available to the principal despite his ability to observe the 
agent’s activities [11]. 
4 Including all principal-agent relations, i.e. all relations in which a principal hires an agent to act on 
his behalf. On the principal-agent theory, see Jensen and Meckling [12]. 
5 One modern way to communicate experiences with certain agents is online feedback systems: espe-
cially in dealing with anonymous counterparts (e.g. sellers in online auctions), where information is 
hidden and distributed asymmetrically, their reputation becomes a dominant factor in the selection. 
Online feedback systems allow participants to share experiences and, by so doing, maintain the mar-
ket [41]. 
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Emergence of regulation 
Establishing the reputation of potential counterparties can be a time-
consuming undertaking, especially for outsiders who are not regularly con-
tracting for the respective goods or services. Buyers (principals) may 
therefore incur substantial search costs in trying to establish the reputation 
of different service providers (i.e. agents). They will thus be interested in 
quality signals that reduce their search costs.  
Under certain circumstances, agents as well are interested in quality sig-
nals: in highly reputation-sensitive industries, the reputation of peers will 
to some extent become interlocked. A bad reputation for the sector as a 
whole will negatively affect individuals offering services of high quality. 
As demonstrated with the market for used cars,6 high-quality providers in 
such markets will not easily succeed in proving that they offer superior 
quality, and thus, they will not be able to charge the correct price for their 
service. High quality providers can therefore be expected to act against 
low quality providers by establishing standards or labels and issuing qual-
ity signals to potential customers [11, 28]. Under such conditions, self-
regulation can be expected to emerge. Examples are professional organisa-
tions of physicians or lawyers. If a sector is critical to the public interest, 
quality signals may be supported by specific laws, or the standard-setting 
function may be assumed entirely by the state.  
Whether a quality signal actually leads to a reduction of search costs de-
pends on its performance. The performance of a standard or the reliability 
of its setter is only partially measurable. Consequently, this issue is subject 
to information asymmetries as well and, therefore, to the mechanism of 
reputation. To some extent, the reputation of the individual service pro-
vider is complemented or replaced by the reputation of the standard or the 
standard setter. 
                                                     
6 An example of the so-called “market for lemons”. The term refers to a problem of information 
asymmetry: if there is a high level of information asymmetry in a market with potentially bad 
agents, the probability of getting a bad product (a “lemon”) rises; therefore, consumers’ willingness 
to pay high prices is reduced in general [1]. 
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Regulation and moral hazard 
Quality signals always have distorting effects. According to the “club the-
ory”, it is typically attractive to only minimally meet the standards [6]. 
Standards thus foster a tendency to favour form over substance.7 
If market participants observe that merely formal compliance is suffi-
cient, the regulator risks not being taken seriously any more. The regula-
tor’s reputation and its ability to issue a quality signal are compromised. 
Setting and enforcing standards resembles an arms race: the regulator will 
continuously be challenged by attempts to dodge its standards and, unless 
it accepts the risk of losing its reputation, the regulator will have to fight 
back with ever more sophisticated standards and enforcement procedures. 
Within such a cycle lies a risk of over-regulation, as the regulator is most 
likely to be challenged by the marginal – and not the average – market par-
ticipant [13]. 
Regulation and risk awareness 
Successful regulation gives market participants a sense of safety in dealing 
with a regulated counterparty. In selecting their counterparties, market par-
ticipants become less attentive to the counterparty risk. In areas such as 
public transport electronic goods, or financial institutions, regulation re-
places the natural risk awareness of consumers who thus tend to be less 
aware of the risks inherent in their contracting.8 While at first sight this 
may seem to be just another case of moral hazard, replacing mistrust with 
trust can create important social benefits. Complex markets such as the fi-
nancial market could not function on the basis of mistrust; rather, it re-
quires a certain level of trust [4].9 Such a “guarded trust” – a neither naive 
nor permanently suspicious attitude towards each other – relieves parties 
from burdensome search costs of individually establishing their counter-
                                                     
7 One can typically get away with substantive, but not with formal non-compliance. One means to 
counteract such tendencies could be to argue with the abuse of rights; a measure, however, that is 
usually bound to very strict conditions [40]. 
8 Even if a cableway or a ski lift looks old, people will use it without further ado, trusting in proper 
maintenance prescribed and (hopefully) enforced by regulation. A study in Switzerland even showed 
that pedestrian crossings crosswalks tend to be the most dangerous place to cross a street, mainly 
due to the pedestrian’s inattentiveness based on their trust in the crossing’s safety [21]. 
9 There are, of course, still many advocates of free markets, as the current controversial discussion re-
garding the financial market crisis shows [13]. 
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parties’ standing. In this way, regulation can provide for faster and more 
efficient contracting, and thus creates a more efficient market as a whole. 
Regulator as guarantor 
While this reduction of risk awareness allows for more efficient trading, it 
also creates certain expectations of market participants towards the regula-
tor.10 The effect of regulation on the behaviour of market participants is 
similar to the effects of an insurance contract: within a regulated market, 
participants will behave differently in screening, selecting and monitoring 
their counterparties. Under an insurance contract, though, the insured pays 
the insurer for the assumption of a specific risk, and receives, in return, a 
well-defined claim against the insurer upon the occurrence of the event in-
sured. The regulator typically does not assume a formal liability for the 
quality of the regulatory signal, just as he is not specifically compensated 
for assuming the relevant responsibility. As a consequence, while market 
participants grow inattentive of inherent risks, they do not receive a legally 
enforceable claim for compensation against the regulator even if the regu-
latory signal was wrong. Regulation creates expectations without assuming 
responsibility.11 
During testing times – such as natural disasters, plane crashes or the cur-
rent financial crisis – this fact may come to the attention of market partici-
pants. In a singular occurrence, the regulator will try to sustain the validity 
of the regulatory signal, for example by explaining the incident with fac-
tors not related to the signal. If, however, the crisis turns out to run deeper, 
the reputation of the regulator is questioned, and the regulatory signal itself 
no longer considered trustworthy. There is a risk that mistrust might re-
place the “guarded trust” amongst market participants.12 
                                                     
10 Expectations rise with a positive track record (i.e. a good reputation) of the regulator, since market 
participants become accustomed to a certain level of trust. 
11 The case is different if a regulator violates its own duty to supervise the implementation of regula-
tory standards. This could lead to a legal responsibility of the government based on a law regarding 
the liability of the state (Verantwortlichkeitsgesetz, SR 170.32). The conditions are strict, as demon-
strated when a liability claim against the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC) was rejected 
in a 1990 decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court (BGE 116 Ib 193, 196); see also [39]. 
12 This could be seen in the current financial crisis: while banks reacted to the loss of trust by refusing 
interbank credits, customers withdrew their savings from ‘infected’ banks. 
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Re-establishing the reputation 
Deregulation 
One radical answer to regulatory failure might be deregulation. What can-
not be effectively regulated is better not regulated at all: no wrong signals 
are sent. Without “guarded trust” instilled by regulation, people will again 
become risk conscious. As attractive as such an approach may seem at 
first, it cannot work in complex markets for two reasons: first, regulatory 
signals are a prerequisite for efficient trading in complex markets. Replac-
ing regulatory signals by market participants’ individual caution would 
lead to astronomically high transactions costs, in effect strangling such 
markets. Second, market participants are accustomed to a certain degree of 
regulatory protection. Once the market has become used to trading based 
on a certain level of trust, the road back to Hobbes’ state of general mis-
trust is blocked. 
Assuming responsibility 
Lacking the alternative of fundamental deregulation, regulators will there-
fore have to fight to re-establish their signalling capability. One strategy 
for reaching this goal is to assume the responsibility for the expectations 
created by the regulatory signal. In deciding whether to assume responsi-
bility, the regulator will find itself in a precarious position. If the regulator 
does not act against market participants complying only formally with 
standards while neglecting its substance, the regulator’s reputation will be 
affected. On the other hand, if the regulator does offer help to companies 
facing difficulties, it could face opportunistic behaviour from market par-
ticipants who bet on and seek to profit from such an implicit government 
guarantee.13 In general, assuming responsibility for past signalling can 
therefore only be an intermediary solution. 
                                                     
13 This balancing act could be seen in the financial crisis in 2008, during which some banks were saved 
by financial support from regulators (to strengthen the system), and others were not (to set exam-
ples) [18]. 
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Strengthening regulation 
In the long run, the regulator has little choice other than strengthening 
regulation. There are different ways to do so: with a long-term perspective, 
the regulator may choose a new approach to regulation, i.e. restructuring 
market supervision as a whole. It may introduce changes in the regula-
tion’s concept, or new requirements. This, however, takes time, and is not 
an adequate short-term response to an imminent crisis. Another approach 
to strengthen regulation is to set up tougher rules, i.e. to eliminate flaws in 
the previous framework.14 Finally, the focus may be shifted to the en-
forcement of existing rules. Because lawmakers tend to focus on rules and 
neglect their enforcement, many regulations are conceptually sound but in-
sufficiently enforced.15 
Regulation of financial markets 
The financial sector – as one of the most important but also most complex 
markets of the economy – provides a good example for the interaction of 
reputation and regulation. 
Financial markets: Need for reduction of complexity 
The financial stability of a company is assessed based on its balance sheet, 
i.e. the assets and liabilities a company has. The relatively simple mathe-
matics of the balance sheet may give the impression that the total worth of 
a company can be represented and its future performance assessed with 
plain and reliable numbers. The valuation of the individual assets and li-
abilities, however, reveal the complexity behind it. 
                                                     
14 Although such action is certainly required, one cannot overlook the political dimension: usually, 
regulators ask for tough rules, which are scaled down in the course of the political decision-making 
process. By acknowledging the failure of the existing regulation and setting up new and tougher re-
quirements, the regulator is able to openly criticize previous political decisions, and thus create mo-
mentum for future actions. 
15 Again, for political reasons, the approach of focusing changes on the enforcement of rules is very 
popular among regulatory authorities: it translates into further powers and higher budgets for regula-
tors. 
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Balance sheet 
The balance sheet of the Credit Suisse Group – one of the few big Euro-
pean banks that until now has managed to refinance itself without state 
support – may serve as an example for the developments in bank balance 
sheets within the last fifty years. Looking back to 1957, Credit Suisse was 
mainly a domestic bank. All markets in which it was active were heavily 
cartelised and, consequently, volatility was low. Back in 1957, the bank 
had assets with a book value (corrected for inflation) of CHF 4.5 bn and an 
equity ratio of 7.5% [24]. Today, Credit Suisse is a global player in highly 
competitive and highly volatile markets. The reported capitalisation by far 
exceeds regulatory requirements. In 2007 Credit Suisse had assets of CHF 
1.415 bn. The equity ratio, however, has dropped to 3.17%. While the bal-
ance sheet of Credit Suisse is rather conservative compared to other banks, 
it has become more than twice as risky since 1957, notwithstanding the 
fact that the bank today is confronted with market risks which would have 
been inconceivable in 1957. 
Valuation models and intangibles 
A glance at the assets reveals important changes as well. In 1957, all assets 
had to be reported at historical value, reflecting the initial purchase price of 
an asset, minus depreciations. Historic accounting tends to understate asset 
values: in 1957, the bank’s real estate, for example, was booked at roughly 
one-fifth of its fair value [25]. Such understatement creates latent reserves. 
Under today’s IFRS rules,16 assets have to be reported at fair value, i.e. at 
current prices. Conceptually, fair-value accounting is clearly superior to 
historic accounting: while the latter requires booking assets at the initial 
purchase price, fair-value accounting reflects the current value of the as-
sets. The benefit of the conservative (historical) approach was its cushion-
ing effect: companies could go through shorter restructurings without an-
nouncing them to the markets, and could thus protect their reputation. The 
paradigm shift has revolutionized accounting by making it much more ac-
curate. But with the disappearance of latent reserves, companies’ balance 
sheets became substantially more risky. 
Fair-value accounting aims to reflect the current worth of the company 
in its balance sheet. Assets that are traded on liquid markets are booked at 
their market value (mark-to-market). Other assets are valued based on 
                                                     
16 IFRS 7, IAS 39. 
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valuation models (mark-to-model). While such models may give a reason-
able estimation of the value of an asset under the model’s assumptions, the 
true value of the asset is difficult to determine [34]. Liabilities as well are 
valued according to the fair-value rule: the fair value of a liability depends 
on the creditworthiness of the debtor, and is either equivalent to its nomi-
nal value (if the company is in good financial standing) or lower. Conse-
quently, the downgrading of a company results in a profit booked in the 
profit and loss statement.17 
A further complexity stems from assets or liabilities that are non-
tangible. If in a takeover a premium is paid to the seller, that amount is 
booked as goodwill in the balance sheet.18 Moreover, certain intangible as-
sets such as patents, know-how or innovations are booked at estimated 
values [9].19  
Self-regulation and government regulation 
These difficulties in the valuation of assets and liabilities clearly show that 
accounting cannot resolve all information asymmetries between market 
participants. As a consequence, market participants cannot evaluate all 
risks inherent in financial transactions themselves.20 They have to rely on 
signals regarding traded assets, counterparty risks as well as the stability of 
the market as a whole. To that effect, standards and rating procedures have 
been developed aimed at ensuring a certain quality of assessment. How-
ever, these measures of self-regulation do not fully eliminate information 
asymmetries, either. Financial reporting, for example, reduces information 
asymmetry by providing financial information in aggregate form. As 
shown, though, the reliance on valuation models leaves the market with 
few means for establishing the accuracy of this representation. This re-
quires yet another quality signal: by giving formal audit clearance, the 
                                                     
17 According to its third-quarter financial statement of 2008, Swiss bank UBS was able to book a profit 
of CHF 2.2 bn solely on valuation gains on its liabilities [31]. 
18 According to IFRS rules, there are clear rules on how to book goodwill (see IFRS 3 and IAS 36.15), 
but companies may still ‘hide’ goodwill by assigning that amount in ways so as to compensate for 
losses. 
19 Such distortions of a company’s balance sheet may create expectation gaps. Zurich Financial Ser-
vices distinguishes between the IFRS balance sheet and the “Available Financial Resources”, i.e. an 
economic view of financial resources to cover policyholders in the event of a worst-case loss. In 
such a calculation, among other adjustments, intangible assets are removed and intangible liabilities 
added to the shareholders’ equity [42]. 
20 As one bank manager put it: “The requirements for information […] have gone beyond our abilities 
to gather it.” [4]. 
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auditor confirms that the financial reports are an accurate and adequate 
representation of the company’s financial standing.21 Similar mechanisms 
are in operation regarding the valuation of a company’s risk exposure or 
the assessment and rating of complex financial instruments [4].  
In the end, financial standards, rating agencies and auditors – all institu-
tions in charge of providing the market with quality signals regarding cer-
tain aspects of the financial market – are subject to mechanisms of reputa-
tion themselves. Again, the determination of such reputation is difficult 
and time-consuming, and thus expensive. Given the important economic 
and social function of the financial sector,22 governments cannot afford in-
efficiency in financial markets. Governments, therefore, are required to is-
sue quality signals regarding the various aspects of the market: the state, 
through its regulator, supports quality signals regarding financial institu-
tions, reporting standards, auditors or rating agencies, thereby assuring the 
soundness of the financial market as a whole.23 By issuing such signals, the 
regulator creates a “guarded trust” among market participants, and thus 
provides for the possibility of efficient interaction.  
The current financial market crisis 
Moral hazard 
Market participants rely on quality signals when selecting counterparties, 
traded assets or risks. In other words, they favour form over substance: 
transactions in complex financial instruments24 as well as the assessment of 
counterparty risk25 are based on ratings or regulatory approval. In effect, 
they are thus based on the reputation of the respective regulatory institu-
                                                     
21 “Accountants are the gatekeepers of our financial markets. Without accountants to ensure the quality 
and integrity of financial information, the markets for capital would be far less efficient, the cost of 
capital would be far higher […].” [38]; see also [22]. 
22 In Switzerland, the financial sector alone accounts for about 10% of GDP, generates up to 14% of 
value added, and contributes to around 10% of total tax revenues at all levels. Moreover, the finan-
cial sector employs more than 5% of the total workforce in Switzerland [30]. 
23 The state could do so by introducing licences for banks, auditors or rating agencies. Also, it can sup-
port or prescribe the usage of certain reporting standards. 
24 Within the past decade, financial institutions have increasingly traded derivatives, although accord-
ing to Frank Partnoy, University of San Diego expert on derivatives, “[n]o one, including regulators, 
could get an accurate picture of this market” [13; see also 4, 7]. 
25 In June 2008, the Belgian bank Dexia, for example, reported a risk-weighted (Basel II) equity ratio 
of 11.4% and thus met regulatory requirements. But its core capital ratio (i.e. the ratio that deter-
mines long-term creditworthiness) at that time was only 1.6% [3]. 
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tions [4, 17]. The reliance on quality signals creates an incentive to just 
minimally meet the respective requirements. Financial reporting and as-
sessment procedures leave room for individual adjustments of substantive 
issues. A company’s management could be tempted, in case of negative 
developments, to take a short-term view and cover up losses with assess-
ment adjustments, hoping that things will straighten out before the day of 
reckoning.26 The risk in such a procedure is well known. Yet knowing that 
governments would ultimately step in to save failing banks for systemic 
reasons, there is no incentive – either for a bank’s managers or its owners – 
to stop speculating or to question the system of quality signals currently in 
place. 
Failing regulatory signals 
The concurrence of low capitalisation and a reliance on risk and valuation 
models have led to the current crisis in financial markets. Like most mar-
ket participants, regulators did not have the mathematical knowledge for 
their own independent assessment of risk-control concepts. As a conse-
quence, they restricted themselves to a rather distant review of the banks’ 
internal risk-control and valuation models. By doing so, banking regulators 
sent a positive signal regarding the capitalization of the big international 
banks without fully understanding their balance sheets. During the summer 
of 2007, the markets started to realise that regulatory capital requirements 
were inadequate, notably in the case of banks that had many basically il-
liquid assets on their balance sheets.  
Banks knew from their own balance sheets that complying with formal 
requirements did not mean that one was sufficiently capitalised to be cred-
itworthy. Blind trust was thus replaced by realistic credit risk assessment; 
quality signals were no longer trustworthy, and market participants were 
no longer prepared to bank on these regulatory signals at more or less risk-
free rates [2, 37]. 
The consequence was a breakdown of the regulatory signalling capacity. 
The current crisis in financial markets, therefore, is also a product of regu-
lation. The megatrend towards much riskier balance sheets, combined with 
complex accounting standards, could not have happened without regulators 
                                                     
26 When market prices fell dramatically during the current financial crisis, banks tried to convince 
regulators that the “true” value of their assets was not reflected by the mark-to-market rule, but 
rather by applying models (such as the discounted cash flow model) even to frequently traded (but 
undervalued) assets [19]. 
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issuing approving signals which replaced the market’s natural risk aware-
ness with trust among participants.  
Consequences for the regulator 
Assuming responsibility 
The fault, of course, cannot be solely assigned to the regulator. Yet it was 
an unavoidable consequence of the regulators’ signalling that the state had 
to step in and assume responsibility to a certain extent. At first, the regula-
tors sought to control the situation by helping a few banks while neglecting 
others, and explaining their failures with factors not related to regulatory 
issues. The crash of Lehman Brothers, though, proved that the bankruptcy 
of systemically important institutions is no reasonable option for financial 
markets. That incident led to a massive loss of trust and to the failure of 
the credit market in 2008. Although governments realised the importance 
of interventions their actions were unpredictable both in scope and aims 
[4] and thus further decreased the level of trust in the financial market. 
In the financial sector, the implicit government guarantee [16] is a con-
sequence of the constant and strong exposure of the government’s regula-
tory signals and their inherent assurance regarding the market. What is 
lacking, though, is a clear set of rules for predictable and balanced inter-
vention [4]. 
Strengthening of regulation  
The state cannot refrain from strengthening the rules. The regulatory 
framework is constantly updated in line with the evolution of the financial 
market itself. Tougher rules and better enforcement procedures are being 
discussed [8, 29, 36].  
The assumption of responsibility in certain cases can strengthen the 
regulatory signal. This concept of an implicit government guarantee, how-
ever, leaves the state in a precarious position: while companies will always 
bet on the government not letting down an important market, the govern-
ment does not have enough influence to control its own risk exposure. The 
massive negative impacts of the failure of a bank (for example, Lehman 
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Brothers), has put an end to the idea that the assumption of responsibility 
would be the regulator’s choice: in markets as complex and important as 
the financial sector, the government will always be a lender of last resort 
[16]. A long-term solution thus has to focus on the institutional setting.27 
Regulation can no longer be delegated to various state and non-state actors 
with uncoordinated powers. It has to be acknowledged that the regulation 
of the financial market is a core task of the government. Predictable state 
intervention requires a clear set of rules, including the assignment of re-
sponsibility to a central authority and the adjustment of risk exposure 
based on a state’s financial strength.28 An effective control of the govern-
ment’s regulatory signal can only be based on better access to information, 
and thus a stronger integration of the government in the financial market.29  
Conclusion 
In incomplete contracting, i.e. contracting based on asymmetric informa-
tion, the reputation of parties is a key factor in selecting counterparties. 
Especially for repeated interactions within a group of players, reputation is 
often the only mechanism to enforce performance. In order to simplify the 
process of selecting counterparties, reputation signals are issued, usually 
by some standard-setting body or the state. If such a quality signal be-
comes strong, market participants will no longer test their counterparties’ 
qualities themselves, but rather rely on the signal. However, a quality sig-
nal may not be based on a thorough analysis of the whole market, and, 
thus, its signal may fail. For regulators of complex markets, the answers to 
such regulatory failure are limited: while deregulation is not an option, the 
regulator will have to both assume some responsibility for the expectations 
created, and try to strengthen the regulation. 
An economy’s most fundamental sectors cannot be left unregulated. The 
financial market especially, where information is distributed highly asym-
metrically, cannot function without regulatory signals. Regulation in these 
markets is to be viewed not as an interruption to market forces, but as a fa-
                                                     
27 The Group of Thirty, a think tank of economy leaders, in its 2008 “A Framework for Financial Sta-
bility”, proposed steps aimed at “[r]eforming the structure of prudential regulation, including the 
role of central banks, the implications for the workings of ‘lender-of-last-resort’ facilities and other 
elements of the official ‘safety net’ […]” [8]. 
28 The financial power of a state may be assessed by its GDP. The problem has become apparent in 
Iceland, where the failed banks were almost too big to rescue [35]. 
29 The economic and social importance of financial markets is comparable to that of national security, 
a public good that is ensured by classical state institutions. Many financial institutions have been 
(partially) nationalised in the course of the current crisis [23]. 
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cilitator of efficient trade – and thus, regulation has to be viewed as a core 
task of government. In light of weaknesses of the signalling capacity due 
to the difficulty of accurately assessing many market risks, a regulator’s 
signal is likely to overreach, or fail, at times. In such situations the regula-
tor (i.e., in effect, the government) has to take responsibility for the expec-
tations created, based on the mechanism of reputation. In order to provide 
for predictable circumstances of state intervention, a stronger regulatory 
framework requires a clear set of rules to that end. 
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